Abstract. We view a distributed system as a graph of active locations with unidirectional channels between them, through which they pass messages. In this context, the graph structure of a system constrains the propagation of information through it. Suppose a set of channels is a cut set between an information source and a potential sink. We prove that, if there is no disclosure from the source to the cut set, then there can be no disclosure to the sink. We introduce a new formalization of partial disclosure, called blur operators, and show that the same cut property is preserved for disclosure to within a blur operator. This cut-blur property also implies a compositional principle, which ensures limited disclosure for a class of systems that differ only beyond the cut.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider information flow in a true-concurrency, distributed model. Events in an execution may be only partially ordered, and locations communicate via synchronous message-passing. Each message traverses a channel. The locations and channels form a directed graph.
Evidently, the structure of this graph will constrain the flow of information. Distant locations may have considerable information about each other's actions, but only if the information in intermediate regions accounts for this. If a kind of information does not traverse the boundary of some portion of the graph (a cut set ), then it can never be available beyond that. We represent limits on information disclosure using blur operators. A blur operator is a closure operator that returns a set of local behaviors at the information source that should be indistinguishable to the observer. When disclosure from a source to a cut set is limited to within a blur operator, then disclosure to a more distant region is limited to within the same blur operator (see Thm. 28, the cut-blur principle).
The cut-blur principle entails a useful compositional consequence, Cor. 30. Consider any other system that differs from a given one only in its structure beyond the cut. That system will preserve the flow limitations of the first, assuming that it has the same local behaviors as the first in the cut set. We illustrate this by using it to show that a secrecy property for a local network, enforced by a firewall, remains true regardless of changes in the structure of the internet to which the firewall connects it (Example 31).
Frames and Executions
We represent systems by frames. Each frame is a directed graph. Each node, called a location, is equipped with a labeled transition system that defines its possible local behaviors. The arrows are called channels, and allow the synchronous transmission of a message from the location at the arrow tail to the location at the arrow head. Each message also carries some data.
For instance, we can regard a network as determining a frame in various ways. A corporate network may use two routers to control the connection to the public network. It is connected to the external internet i via router r 1 and to two separate internal networks n 1 , n 2 via router r 2 . In the graph on the left in Fig. 1(a) , we regard the routers and network regions as the locations. In Fig. 1 (b) regions are displayed as •; routers, as ⊓ ⊔; and interfaces, as △. When a router has an interface onto a segment, a pair of locations-representing that interface as used in each direction-lie between this router and each peer router [12] :
Example 1 (Network with filtering). Let Dir = {inb, outb} represent the inbound direction and the outbound directions from routers, respectively. Suppose Rt is a set of routers r, each with a set of interfaces intf(r), and a set of network regions Rg containing end hosts.
Each member of Rt, Rg is a separate location. Each interface-direction pair (i, r) ∈ ( r∈Rt intf(r))× Dir is also a location. Essentially, we are introducing one interface between each router/region adjacent pair, and two interfaces between each router/router adjacent pair. See the right graph in Fig. 1(b) .
The channels consist of those shown. In particular, each interface has a pair of channels that allow datagrams to pass between the router and the interface, and between the interface and an adjacent entity. We also include a self-loop channel at each network region i, n 1 , n 2 ; it represents transmissions and receptions among the hosts and network infrastructure coalesced into the region.
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W W r r r r i i The behaviors of the locations are easily specified. The router routes, i.e. receives packets from inbound interfaces, and chooses an outbound interface for each one. The directed interfaces enforce the filtering rules, discarding packets or delivering them. If the router is executing other sorts of processing, for instance Network Address Translation or the IP Security Protocols, then the behavior is slightly more complex [1, 12] , but sharply localized.
///
The Static Model
In this paper, we will be concerned with a static version of the model, in which channel endpoints are never transmitted from one location to another, although we will briefly describe a dynamic alternative in Section 7.2, in which channels may also be delivered over other channels.
Definition 2 (Frame). A (static) frame F has three disjoint domains:
Locations LO: Each location ℓ ∈ LO is equipped with a labeled transition system lts(ℓ) and other information, further constrained below. Channels CH: Each channel c ∈ CH is equipped with two endpoints, entry(c) and exit(c). It is intended as a one-directional conduit of data values between the endpoints. Data values D: Data values v ∈ D may be delivered through channels.
We will write EP for the set of channel endpoints, which we formalize as EP = {entry, exit}×CH, although we will generally continue to type entry(c) and exit(c) to stand for entry, c and exit, c . For each ℓ ∈ LO, there is:
1. a set of endpoints ends(ℓ) ⊆ EP such that (a) e, c ∈ ends(ℓ) and e, c ∈ ends(ℓ ′ ) implies ℓ = ℓ ′ ; and (b) there is an ℓ such that entry(c) ∈ ends(ℓ) iff there is an ℓ ′ such that exit(c) ∈ ends(ℓ ′ );
When entry(c) ∈ ends(ℓ) we will write sender(c) = ℓ; when exit(c) ∈ ends(ℓ) we will write rcpt(c) = ℓ. Thus, sender(c) is the location that can send messages on c, while rcpt(c) is the recipient location that can receive them. 2. a labeled transition system lts(ℓ) with:
states: states(ℓ); it may be finite or infinite, and varies freely with ℓ; initial states: initial(ℓ), with initial(ℓ) ⊆ states(ℓ); labels: labels(ℓ), with members of the forms: local(c, v) where sender(c) = ℓ = rcpt(c) and v ∈ D, i.e. internal events; xmit(c, v) where sender(c) = ℓ = rcpt(c) and v ∈ D; recv(c, v) where sender(c) = ℓ = rcpt(c) and v ∈ D. transition relation: ❀ ℓ where ❀ ℓ ⊆ states(ℓ) × labels(ℓ) × states(ℓ).
. is a computation for lts(ℓ) iff s 0 ∈ initial(ℓ) and for each s j λj ❀ s j+1 , the triple is in the transition relation
The (finite or infinite) sequence λ 0 , λ 1 , . . . of labels is called a trace for lts(ℓ); traces(lts(ℓ)) is the set of all traces of lts(ℓ).
///
Example 3 (Network with filtering). Using the notation of Example 1:
for each ℓ ∈ LO.
For a router r ∈ Rt, its state is a set of received but not yet routed datagrams, and the sole initial state is ∅. The transition relation, when receiving a datagram, adds it to this set. When transmitting a datagram d in the current set, it removes d from the next state and selects an outbound channel as determined by the routing table. For simplicity, we regard the routing table as an unchanging part of determining the transition relation.
For an interface/direction pair (i, d) ∈ (intf(r) × Dir), the state again consists of set of received but not-yet-processed datagrams. The transition relation depends on an unchanging filter function, which determines for each datagram pair whether to discard it or retransmit it.
If n ∈ Rg is a region, its state is the set of datagrams it has received and not yet retransmitted. It can receive a datagram; transmit one from its state; or else initiate a new datagram. If assumed to be well-configured, these all have source address in a given range of IP addresses. Otherwise, they may be arbitrary. /// Many problems can be viewed as frames. For instance, a cryptographic voting scheme such as Helios or Prêt-à-Voter [2, 24] may be viewed as defining a family of frames; the n voters are some of the locations (see Example 24) . An attestation architecture for secure virtualized systems [8] is, at one level, a set of virtual machines communicating through one-directional channels.
Each F determines directed and undirected graphs, gr(F ) and ungr(F ):
If F is a frame, then the graph of F , written gr(F ), is the directed graph (V, E) whose vertices V are the locations LO, and such that there is an edge (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) ∈ E iff, for some c ∈ CH, sender(c) = ℓ 1 and rcpt(c) = ℓ 2 . The undirected graph ungr(F ) has those vertices, and an undirected edge (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) whenever either (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) or (ℓ 2 , ℓ 1 ) is in the edges of gr(F ).

Execution semantics
We give an execution model for a frame via partially ordered sets of events. The key property is that the events that involve any single location ℓ should determine a trace for lts(ℓ).
Definition 5 (Events; Executions). Let F be a frame, and let E be a structure E, chan, msg . The members of E are events, equipped with the functions:
chan : |E| → CH returns the channel of each event; and msg : |E| → D returns the message communicated in each event.
1. B = (B, ) is a system of events for F , E, written B ∈ ES(F , E), iff is a partial ordering on B and, for every e 1 ∈ B, {e 0 ∈ B : e 0 e 1 } is finite.
Hence, B is well-founded. If B = (B, ), we refer to B as ev(B) and to as
2. Define proj(B, ℓ) = {e ∈ B : sender(chan(e)) = ℓ or rcpt(chan(e)) = ℓ}.
3. B is an execution, written B ∈ Exc(F ) iff, for every ℓ ∈ LO, (a) proj(B, ℓ) is linearly ordered by , and (b) proj(B, ℓ) yields a trace of lts(ℓ) when we convert each event e to a label in lts(ℓ) by mapping:
, msg(e)) if sender(chan(e)) = ℓ = rcpt(chan(e)) xmit(chan(e), msg(e)) if sender(chan(e)) = ℓ = rcpt(chan(e)) recv(chan(e), msg(e)) if sender(chan(e)) = ℓ = rcpt(chan(e)) /// By Def. 5, Clauses 1 and 3a, proj(B, ℓ) is a finite or infinite sequence, ordered by . Thus Clause 3b is well-defined. We will often write A, A ′ , etc., when A, A ′ ∈ Exc(F ). For a frame F , the choice between two different structures E 1 , E 2 makes little difference: If E 1 , E 2 have the same cardinality, then to within isomorphism they lead to the same systems of events and hence also executions. Thus, we will suppress the parameter E, henceforth.
is an initial substructure of B 2 iff it is a substructure of the latter, and for all y ∈ B 1 , if x 2 y, then x ∈ B 1 .
Being an execution is preserved under chains of initial substructures: Suppose that B i i∈N is a sequence where each
Following Sutherland [28] , we think of information flow in terms of deducibility or disclosure. A participant observes part of the system behavior, trying to draw conclusions about a different part. If his observations exclude some possible behaviors of that part, then he can deduce that those behaviors did not occur. His observations have disclosed something. These observations occur on a set of channels C o , and the deductions constrain the events on a set of channels C s . C o is the set of observed channels, and C s is the set of source channels. The observations tell the observer about what happened at the source. The observer has access to the events occurring on the channels in C o in an execution. Some events on the channels C s may be compatible or incompatible with the observations on C o . Definition 8. Let C ⊆ CH be a set of channels, and let B ∈ ES(F ). 1. We define B | C to be (B 0 , R), where
B ∈ ES(F )
is a C-run iff for some A ∈ Exc(F ), B = A | C. We write C-runs(F ), or sometimes just C-runs, for the set of C-runs of F .
is the set of C ′ -runs compatible with the C-run B, i.e.:
, the lower index C indicates what type of local run B is. The upper index C ′ indicates the type of local runs in the resulting set. J stands for "joint." J C ′ C (B) makes sense even if C and C ′ overlap, though behavior on C ∩ C ′ is not hidden from observations at C.
No disclosure means that any observation B at C is compatible with everything that could have occurred at C ′ , where compatible means that there is some execution that combines the local C-run with the desired C ′ -run. We summarize "no disclosure" by the Leibnizian slogan: Everything possible is compossible, "compossible" being a coinage meaning possible together. If B, B ′ are each separately possible in the sense that they are C, C ′ -runs respectively, then there's an execution A combining them, and restricting to each of them.
Definition 10. F has no disclosure from C to C ′ iff, for all C-runs B,
Symmetry of disclosure
Like Shannon's mutual information and Sutherland's non-deducibility [28] , "no disclosure" is symmetric:
2. There is no disclosure from C ′ to C if for every C-run B, for every
Because of this symmetry, we can speak of no disclosure between C and
We also sometimes say that B 1 witnesses for
Lemma 15 gives a condition under which this inclusion is an equality. 
Similarly for the primed versions.
Suppose that
B 3 ∈ J C3 C1 (B 1 ), so that there exists an A ∈ Exc(F ) such that B 1 = A |C 1 and B 3 = A |C 3 . Letting B 2 = A |C 2 , the execution A ensures that B 2 ∈ J C2 C1 (B 1 ) and B 3 ∈ J C3 C2 (B 2 ). ⊓ ⊔
The Cut Principle for Non-disclosure
Our key observation is that non-disclosure respects the graph structure of a frame F . If cut ⊆ CH is a cut set in the undirected graph ungr(F ), then disclosure from a source set src ⊆ CH to a sink obs ⊆ CH is controlled by disclosure to cut. If there is no disclosure from src to cut, there can be no disclosure from src to obs. As we will see in Section 6, this property extends to limited disclosure in the sense of disclosure to within a blur operator. If C ⊆ CH, we let ends(C) = {ℓ : ∃c ∈ C . sender(c) = ℓ or rcpt(c) = ℓ}. Recall that chans(L) = {c : sender(c) ∈ L or rcpt(c) ∈ L}. For a singleton set {ℓ} we suppress the curly braces and write chans(ℓ).
Definition 13. Let src, cut, obs ⊆ CH be sets of channels; cut is an undirected cut (or simply a cut) between src, obs iff 1. src, cut, obs are pairwise disjoint; and 2. every undirected path p 1 in ungr(F ) from any ℓ 1 ∈ ends(obs) to any ℓ 2 ∈ ends(src) traverses some member of cut.
/// For instance, in Fig. 1(b) , {c 1 , c 2 } form a cut between chans(i) and chans({n 1 , n 2 }).
Lemma 14. Let cut be a cut between left, right, and CH ⊆ cut ∪ left ∪ right. Let
Proof. Since B lc and B rc are local runs, they are restrictions of executions, so choose
Now define A by stipulating:
A = the least partial order extending B lc ∪ Brc .
Since A 1 , A 2 agree on cut, ev(A) = ev(B lc |left)∪ev(B rc ), and we could have used the latter as an alternate definition of ev(A), as well as the symmetric restriction of B rc to right leaving B lc whole. The definition of A as a partial order is sound, because there are no cycles in the union (6) . Cycles would require A 1 and A 2 to disagree on the order of events in their restrictions to cut, contrary to assumption. Likewise, the finitepredecessor property is preserved: x 0 A x 1 iff x 0 , x 1 belong to the same B ?c and are ordered there, or else there is an event in B ?c |cut which comes between them. Hence, the set of events preceding x 1 is the finite union of finite sets.
Moreover, A is an execution: A's projection proj(A, ℓ) on any one location ℓ is linearly ordered, and a trace of lts(ℓ). However, ℓ does not have channels on both left and right. If ℓ has no channels on right, then proj(A, ℓ) = proj(A 1 , ℓ), which is linearly ordered and a trace of lts(ℓ) because A 1 ∈ Exc(F ). Otherwise, proj(A, ℓ) = proj(A 2 , ℓ); because A 2 ∈ Exc(F ), proj(A 2 , ℓ) is a trace of lts(ℓ). ⊓ ⊔ What makes this proof work? Any one location either has all of its channels lying in left ∪ cut or else all of them lying in right ∪ cut. When piecing together the two executions A 1 , A 2 into a single execution B, no location needs to be able to execute a trace that comes partly from A 1 and partly from A 2 . This is what determines our definition of cuts using the undirected graph ungr(F ).
Lemma 15. Let cut be an undirected cut between src, obs. Let B s , B c , B o be a src-run, a cut-run, and an obs-run, resp., where
Then B s ∈ J src obs (B o ). Hence:
Proof
By the cut property, src ⊆ right. So left, cut, right form a partition of CH. Thus, we may apply Lemma 14. The execution A witnesses for compatibility. ⊓ ⊔ Example 17. In Fig. 1 (b) let r 1 be configured to discard all inbound packets, and r 2 to discard all outbound packets. Then the empty event system is the only member of {c 1 , c 2 }-runs. Hence there is no disclosure between chans(i) and {c 1 , c 2 }. By Thm. 16, there is no disclosure to chans({n 1 , n 2 }).
///
In particular, disconnected portions of a frame cannot interfere:
If there is no path between src and obs in ungr(F ), then there is no disclosure between them.
Proof. Then cut = ∅ is an undirected cut set, and there is only one cut-run, namely the empty system of events. It is thus compatible with all src-runs. ⊓ ⊔
Blur operators
Turning from no disclosure to partial disclosure, for every frame and regions of interest src ⊆ CH and obs ⊆ CH, there is an equivalence relation on src-runs:
Definition 19. Let src, obs ⊆ CH. If B 1 , B 2 are src-runs, we say that they are obs-equivalent, and write B 1 ≈ obs B 2 , iff, for all obs-runs B o ,
Lemma 20. For each obs, ≈ obs is an equivalence relation.
///
No disclosure means that all src-runs are obs-equivalent. Any notion of partial disclosure can respect obs-equivalence, since no observations can possibly "split" apart obs-equivalent src-runs. Partial disclosures always respect unions of obs-equivalence classes. Hence, every notion of partial equivalence has three properties. We will group them together in the following notion of a blur operator, because they are the technical conditions that matter in our proofs:
Definition 21. A function f on sets is a blur operator iff it satisfies:
Inclusion: For all sets S, S ⊆ f (S); Idempotence: f is idempotent, i.e. for all sets S, f (f (S)) = f (S); and Union: f commutes with unions: If S a∈I is a family indexed by the set I, then
S is an f -blurred set iff f is a blur operator and S = f (S).
By Idempotence, S is f -blurred iff it is in the range of the blur operator f . Since S = a∈S {a}, the Union property says that f is determined by its action on the singleton subsets of S. Thus, Inclusion could have said a ∈ f ({a}).
Lemma 22. Suppose that A is a set, and R is a partition of the elements of A.
There is a unique function f R on sets S ⊆ A such that 1. f ({a}) = S iff a ∈ S and S ∈ R; 2. f commutes with unions (Eqn. 3).
Moreover, f R is a blur operator.
Proof. Since S = a∈S {a}, f R (S) is defined by the union principle (Eqn. 3). Inclusion and Union are immediate from the form of the definition. Idempotence holds because being in the same R-equivalence class is transitive.
⊓ ⊔
Although every equivalence relation determines a blur operator, the converse is not true: Not every blur operator is of this form. For instance, consider the set A = {a, b}, and let f ({a}) = {a}, f ({b}) = f ({a, b}) = {a, b}. We will study information disclosure to within blur operators f , which we interpret as meaning that J C ′ C (B c ) is f -blurred. Essentially, this is an "upper bound" on how much information may be disclosed when B c is observed. The observer will know an f -blurred set that the behavior at C ′ belongs to. However, the observer cannot infer anything finer than the f -blurred sets. Think of blurring an image: The viewer no longer knows the details of the scene. The viewer knows only that it was some scene which, when blurred, would look like this. In this interpretation of the knowledge available to the observer, we follow the tradition of epistemic logic [10] ; see also [3] . Definition 23. Let obs, src ⊆ CH, and let f be a function on sets of src-runs.
F restricts disclosure from src to obs to within f iff f is a blur operator and, for every obs-run B o , J src obs (B o ) is an f -blurred set. We also say that F f -limits src-to-obs flow.
///
At one extreme, the no-disclosure condition is also disclosure to within a blur operator, namely the blur operator that ignores S and adds all C ′ -runs:
At the other extreme, the maximally permissive security policy is represented as disclosure to within the identity function f id (S) = S. The blur operator f id also shows that every frame restricts disclosure to within some blur operator. The equivalence classes generated by compatibility are always f id -blurred.
Example 24. Suppose that F is an electronic voting system (e.g. Helios or Prêt-à-Voter [2, 24] ). Some locations L EC are run by the election commission. We will regard the voters themselves as a set of locations L V . Each voter delivers a message containing his encrypted vote for a candidate. The election officials observe the channels connected to L EC , i.e. chans(L EC ). To determine the correct outcome, they must infer a property of the local run at chans(L V ), namely, how many votes for each candidate occurred. However, they should not find out which voter voted for which candidate [9] .
We formalize this via a blur operator. Suppose B ′ ∈ chans(L V )-runs is a possible behavior of all voters in L V . Suppose that π is a permutation of L V . Let π·B ′ be the behavior in which each voter ℓ ∈ L V casts not his own actual vote, but the vote actually cast by π(ℓ). That is, π represents one way of reallocating the actual votes among different voters. Now for any S ⊆ chans(L V )-runs let This example is easily adapted to other considerations. For instance, the commissioners of elections are also voters, and they know how they voted themselves. Thus, we could define a (narrower) blur operator f 1 that only uses the permutations that leave commissioners' votes fixed.
In the next example, we write select B p for the result of selecting those events e ∈ ev(B) that satisfy the predicate p(e), restricting to the selected events.
Example 25. Suppose in Fig. 1(b) : Router r 1 discards inbound (downwardflowing) packets unless their source is an address in i and the destination is an address in n 1 , n 2 . Router r 2 discards inbound packets unless the destination address is the IP for a web server www in n 1 , and the destination port is 80 or 443, or else their source port is 80 or 443 and their destination port is ≥ 1024.
Outbound (upward-flowing) packets are treated symmetrically. A packet is importable iff its source address is in i and either its destination is www and its destination port is 80 or 443; or else its destination address is in n 1 , n 2 , its source port is 80 or 443, and its destination port is ≥ 1024.
It is exportable iff, symmetrically, its destination address is in i and either its source is www and its source port is 80 or 443; or else its source address is in n 1 , n 2 , its destination port is 80 or 443, and its source port is ≥ 1024. Now consider the operator f i on chans(i)-runs generated as in Lemma 22 from the equivalence relation:
iff they agree on all importable events, i.e.:
The router configurations mentioned above are intended to ensure that there is f i -limited flow from chans(i) to chans({n 1 , n 2 }). This is an integrity condition; it is meant to ensure that systems in n 1 , n 2 cannot be affected by bad (i.e. nonimportable) packets from i. Outbound, the blur f e on chans({n 1 , n 2 })-runs is generated from the equivalence relation:
iff they agree on all exportable events, i.e.:
The router configurations are also intended to ensure that there is f e -limited flow from chans({n 1 , n 2 }) to chans(i). This is a confidentiality condition; it is meant to ensure that external observers learn nothing about the non-exportable traffic, which was not intended to exit the organization.
In this example, it is helpful that the exportable and importable packets are disjoint, and the transmission of one of these packets is never dependent on the reception of a packet of the other kind. In applications lacking this property, proving flow limitations is much harder.
/// 5 Noninterference, Nondeducibility, Blurs Non-interference can fit within our framework, if we specialize frames to state machines (see Fig. 2 ). Let D = {d 1 , . . . , d k } be a finite set of domains, i.e. sensitivity labels; ֒→ ⊆ D × D specifies which domains may influence each other. We assume ֒→ is reflexive, though not necessarily transitive. A is a set of actions, and dom : A → D assigns a domain to each action; O is a set of outputs. M = S, s 0 , A, δ, obs is a (possibly non-deterministic) state machine with states S, initial state s 0 , transition relation δ ⊆ S × A × S, and observation function obs: S × D → O. M has a set of traces α, and each trace α determines a sequence of observations for each domain [23, 29, 30] .
M accepts commands from A along the incoming channels c in i from the d i ; each command a ∈ A received from d i has sensitivity dom(a) = d i . M delivers observations along the outgoing channels c out i . The frame requires a little extra memory, in addition to the states of M , to deliver outputs over the channels c out i . F being star-like, each A ∈ Exc(F ) has a linearly ordered A , since all events are in the linearly ordered proj(A, M ). Let us write:
in for the input behavior in execution A.
Noninterference [11] and its variants are defined by purge functions p for each target domain d i , defined by recursion on input behaviors input(A). The original purge function p o for d i omits all events e ∈ input(A) not satisfying the predicate
. A purge function p i for intransitive ֒→ relations was subsequently proposed by Haigh and Young [13] . In it, each input event e 0 ∈ input(A) is retained by the filter if input(A) has an increasing subsequence e 0 e 1 . . . e i , such that dom(e 0 ) ֒→ dom(e 1 ) ֒→ . . . ֒→ dom(e i ) = d i . In [29] , van der Meyden's purge functions yield tree structures instead of subsequences; every path from a leaf to the root in these trees is a subsequence consisting of permissible effects. This tightens the notion of security, because the trees do not include ordering information between events that lie on different branches to the root. Noninterference is asymmetric: d i 's inputs may interfere with C j even if d j 's inputs cannot interfere with C i . That is because C i , C j contain both inputs and outputs [28] . The idea of p-noninterference is useful only when M is deterministic, since otherwise the outputs observed on c out i may differ even when input(A) = input(A ′ ). For non-deterministic M , nondeducibilityit is more natural.
Lemma 27. Let p be a purge function for domain d i .
F ∈ NI
When the behavior of the source is defined in terms of both the inputs and the outputs, i.e.
no disclosure between C hid+ and C i expresses non-deducibility on strategies [32] .
The Cut-Blur Principle
The symmetry of non-disclosure (Lemma 11) no longer holds for disclosure to within a blur. We have, however, the natural extension of Thm 16:
Theorem 28 (Cut-Blur Principle). Let cut be an undirected cut between src, obs in F . If F f -limits src-to-cut flow, then F f -limits src-to-obs flow.
Proof. By the hypothesis, f is a blur operator. Let B o be a obs-run. We want to show that J This proof is the reason we introduced the Union principle, rather than simply considering all closure operators [18] . Blur operators are those closure operators that satisfy Eqn. 3 and not only Inclusion and Idempotence.
Example 29. The frame of Example 25 has f i -limited flow from chans(i) to the cut {c 1 , c 2 }. Thus, it has f i -limited flow from chans(i) to chans({n 1 , n 2 }).
It also has f e -limited flow from chans({n 1 , n 2 }) to the cut {c 1 , c 2 }. This implies f e -limited flow to chans(i).
///
Our last technical result gives us a way to "transport" a blur security property from one frame F 1 to another frame F 2 . It assumes that the two frames share a common core F 0 , and that a set of channels cut is a cut separating this core from the remainder of F 1 and F 2 .
Corollary 30. Suppose that F 0 is a subframe of F 1 and also of F 2 . Let:
1. cut is an undirected cut between C 0 and C − 1 ; 2. cut is an undirected cut between C 0 and C − 2 ; 3. cut-runs(F 2 ) ⊆ cut-runs(F 1 ).
If F 1 f -limits src-to-cut flow, then F 2 f -limits src-to-obs flow, for any obs ⊆ C − 2 . Proof. By Thm. 28, it suffices to show that F 2 f -limits disclosure from src to cut. Since this is true in F 1 , it suffices to show, for every B c ∈ cut-runs(
Item (i) follows from assumption 3. For item (ii), let B c ∈ cut-runs(F 2 ). We must show that the compatible sets are the same in the two frames.
Assume first that B s ∈ J src cut (B c ) in F 2 , and let B 2 ∈ (C 0 ∪ cut)-runs(F 2 ) witness compatibility on this larger set of channels, so B s = B 2 | src. Since also B c ∈ cut-runs(F 1 ), let B 1 ∈ C − 1 ∪ cut-runs(F 1 ) be a local run in F 1 on the non-C 0 channels, where
Much as in the proof of Lemma 14, define A by stipulating:
A = the least partial order extending B2 ∪ B1 .
Now exactly as in the proof of Lemma 14, it follows that A ∈ Exc(F 1 ) is an execution. Its projections on all locations ℓ ∈ LO(F 1 ) are traces of lts(ℓ); and the ordering is compatible. The converse, that B s ∈ J src cut (B c ) in F 1 implies the same in F 2 , holds by the symmetry of the assumptions.
⊓ ⊔
Cor. 30 is an extremely useful compositional principle. It implies, for instance in connection with Example 29, that non-exportable traffic in n 1 , n 2 remains unobservable even as we vary the top part of Fig. 1(b) .
Example 31. Regarding Fig. 1(b) as the frame F 1 , let F 0 be the part below {c 1 , c 2 }, and let cut = {c 1 , c 2 }. Let F 2 contain F 0 , cut as shown, and have any graph structure above cut such that cut remains a cut between the new structure and F 0 . Let the new locations have any transition systems such that the local runs agree, i.e. cut-runs(F 2 ) = cut-runs(F 1 ). Then by Cor. 30, external observations of chans({n 1 , n 2 }) are guaranteed to blur out non-exportable events. /// It is appealing that our security goal is independent of changes in the structure of the internet that we do not control. A similar property holds for the integrity goal of Example 29 as we alter the internal network. The converse questionspreserving the confidentiality property as the internal network changes, and the integrity property as the internet changes-appear to require a different theorem. Thm. 34 in Appendix A is intended to handle these questions.
Related and Future Work
In this paper, we have explored how the graph structure of a distributed system helps to constrain information flow. We have established the cut-blur principle. It allows us to propagate conclusions about limited disclosure from a cut set cut to more remote parts of the graph. We have also showed a sufficient condition for limitations on disclosure to be preserved under homomorphisms. Most of our examples concern networks and filtering, but the ideas are much more widely applicable.
Related work
There is a massive literature on information-flow security; Goguen and Meseguer were key early contributors [11] . Sutherland introduced the non-deducibility idea as a way to formalize lack of flow, which we have adopted in our "nondisclosure" [28] . He also showed that it is a symmetric relation between the apparent source and sink, as in our Lemma 11. McCullough raised the questions of non-determinism and composability of information-flow properties [16, 17] , which have persisted until today; cf. e.g. [20] . Irvine, Smith, and Volpano initiated a language-based approach [31] , in which systems are programs. Typing ensures that their behaviors satisfy informationflow goals. Sabelfeld and Myers [25] reviewed the early years of this approach. Distributed execution has been considered in language-based work, e.g. [33, 5, 4] . Our work here is not specifically language-based, since our locations need only act as labeled transition systems. If these ltss are specified as programs, however, our results may be usefully combined with language-based methods.
Declassification is a major concern for us. A blur operator expresses an upper bound on what a system may declassify. It may declassify choices unless the blur operators it respects are closed under them. Like escape-hatches [26] , this is disclosure along the what -dimension, in the Sabelfeld-Sands classification [27] .
Mantel, Sands, and Sudbrock [15] provide a rely/guarantee-style method for compositional reasoning about flow in the context of imperative programs. With Roscoe [22, 21] , Morgan [19] and van der Meyden [30] , it is one of a small number of approaches providing conclusions preserved under composition or refinement.
Van der Meyden's work with Chong is most closely related to ours [6] . They consider "architectures," that are directed graphs that express a what -dimension flow policy. These nodes are security domains, intended to represent levels of information sensitivity. The arrows are labeled by functions f , where f filters information from its source, giving an upper bound on visibility to its target. The authors define when a (monolithic) state machine, whose transitions are annotated by domains, complies with an architecture. Their main result is a cut-like epistemic property on the architecture graph: Roughly, any knowledge acquired by a recipient about a source implies that same knowledge is available at every cut set in the architecture graph.
A primary contrast with [6] is our distributed execution model. We consider it a sharper, more localized link to a development model, since components are likely to be designed, implemented, and upgraded piecemeal. Chong and van der Meyden focus instead on the specification level, in which information flow specifications constitute the directed graph. This is a new and unfamiliar artifact the developer must generate before analysis can occur. Their epistemic logic may be more expressive than our blur properties and compatibility, although the extra expressiveness appears not to be used in their examples. Indeed, our clean proof methods suggest that our model may be easy to understand, enrich, and apply.
Van der Meyden and Chong also propose a refinement method [30, 7] . It relates to one possible use of the homomorphisms as defined in the Appendix A, namely those in which the refined system has a homomorphism onto the less refined one. A homomorphism may also be an embedding of one frame into a richer one. In this case, the refinement relation appears to run in the same direction as the homomorphism. Viewed this way, our Thm. 34 entails that security properties are preserved by certain refinements. In this it does not run afoul of the refinement paradox [14, 19] , because it makes additional assumptions.
Future Work: The Dynamic Model
Instead of building ends(ℓ) into the frame, so that it remains fixed through execution, we may alternatively regard it as a component of the state. Then we may enrich the labels xmit(c, v) and recv(c, v) so that they also involve a sequence of endpoints p ⊆ EP:
xmit(c, v, p) recv(c, v, p).
The transition relation is then constrained to allow xmit(c, v, p) in a state only if p ⊆ ends(ℓ) holds in that state, in which case p is omitted in the next state, and recv(c, v, p) causes p to be added to the next state of the receiving location. The cut-blur principle remains true in an important case: A set cut is an invariant cut between src and obs if it is an undirected cut, and moreover the execution of the frame preserves this property. Then the cut-blur principle holds in the dynamic model for invariant cuts. Our definition of homomorphism continues to apply.
This dynamic model should allow interesting analyses of security-aware software, including software using object capabilities. The object capabilities may be viewed as xmit-endpoints. Using a capability is then transmitting a message down the channel to the object itself, which holds the recv-endpoint. When an object transfers a capability, this may be modeled as transmitting its xmit-endpoint down another channel.
We also intend to provide tool support for defining relevant blurs and establishing that they limit disclosure in several application areas. 
